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The present study focused on the interplay between arousal, valence, and cognitive con-
trol.To this end, we investigated how arousal and valence associated with affective stimuli
inﬂuenced cognitive ﬂexibility when switching between tasks voluntarily.Three hypotheses
were tested. First, a valence hypothesis that states that the positive valence of affective
stimuli will facilitate both global and task-switching performance because of increased cog-
nitive ﬂexibility. Second, an arousal hypothesis that states that arousal, and not valence, will
speciﬁcally impair task-switching performance by strengthening the previously executed
task-set. Third, an attention hypothesis that states that both cognitive and emotional con-
trol ask for limited attentional resources, and predicts that arousal will impair both global
and task-switching performance. The results showed that arousal affected task-switching
but not global performance, possibly by phasic modulations of the noradrenergic system
that reinforces the previously executed task. In addition, positive valence only affected
global performance but not task-switching performance, possibly by phasic modulations
of dopamine that stimulates the general ability to perform in a multitasking environment.
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, research on cognitive control has been conducted
without taking into account that goal-directed behavior takes place
in an environment consisting of a multitude of stimuli, some of
which are emotional. Yet, research not only has shown that cog-
nitive control modulates emotions (e.g., Gross, 2002) but also
that emotions inﬂuence cognitive control (e.g., Gray, 1999; for
a review see Pessoa, 2009). Gray et al. (2002) found that activation
in the dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC), which is part of
the cognitive control system, also depends on the presentation of
emotional information. Furthermore, the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) is both connected to the DLPFC and to the limbic sys-
tem (Bush et al., 2000), which is important for emotional control.
Although the connections between emotional and cognitive con-
trol are obvious at the neuro-functional level, at the process level it
is not always clear how both systems interact. In the present study,
we investigated different mechanisms underlying this interplay by
testing the inﬂuence of irrelevant affective pictures on cognitive
ﬂexibility.
Different mechanisms have been proposed that can account
for the relation between cognitive and emotional control. A ﬁrst
mechanism is related to the function of the neurotransmitter
dopamine (DA). Ashby et al. (1999, 2002) argued that positive
information can lead to an increase of DA, resulting in an enhance-
ment of cognitive control (see also Braver et al., 1999; Braver and
Cohen, 2000; Cohen et al., 2002; Savine and Braver, 2010). In
line with this account, it has been shown that positive informa-
tion stimulates cognitive ﬂexibility (e.g., Isen and Daubman, 1984;
Greene and Noice, 1988; Isen et al., 1992; Kuhl and Kazén, 1999;
Bolte et al., 2003; Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006).
More recently, this account has been adjusted in two ways (Cools
et al., 2001, 2007, 2009; Cools and Robbins, 2004). First, pha-
sic and tonic modulations of DA have been dissociated (see also
Cools and Robbins, 2004; Cools et al., 2009). While high tonic DA
favors reward-based learning, low tonic DA favors punishment-
based learning. Second,Cools et al. (2001, 2007) suggested that the
inﬂuence of phasic increases of DA on cognitive control depends
on the demands of the task and on the neural structure in which
the DA levels are changed (see also Frank et al., 2004; Maia and
Frank, 2011). While phasic increases of DA in the striatum lead to
more ﬂexible behavior, and can thus enhance cognitive ﬂexibility,
phasic increases of DA in the PFC lead to less distractible behavior,
which improves protection from irrelevant information, but dete-
riorates cognitive ﬂexibility. In order to test this so-called valence
hypothesis,we manipulated the valence of affective stimuli on trial
basis, presumably resulting in phasic modulations of DA.
A second mechanism that can explain the interplay between
emotional and cognitive control is related to the function of the
neurotransmitter noradrenalin (NA) in the locus coeruleus (LC).
As for DA modulations, Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005) argued
that there are two modes of LC–NA function: a phasic mode that
stimulates behavioral stability and a tonic mode that stimulates
more ﬂexible, but also more distractible behavior. Based on this
original model, Verguts and Notebaert (2009) introduced a bind-
ing account for cognitive control. This account was based on the
observation that when a response conﬂict arises during the exe-
cution of a particular task on trial n-1, a response conﬂict on
trial impairs performance less severely than when no response
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conﬂict was present on trial n-1 (Gratton et al., 1992). Verguts and
Notebaert (2009) argued that the experience of a conﬂict causes
arousal that triggers an immediate boost of levels of NA in the
LC. This phasic increase of LC–NA function stimulates Hebbian
learning (Hebb, 1949),which binds stimulus and response features
into a task-set or event ﬁle (Hommel, 2004) and, as a result, task-
sets prone to arousal become strengthened (see also Braem et al.,
2011). As a consequence, performance based on such task-sets is
impaired less by new response conﬂicts and can thus be interpreted
as more stable and less ﬂexible behavior (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005). In sum, the arousal hypothesis predicts that arousing affec-
tive stimuli, irrespective of their valence, affect cognitive control
by strengthening the components of a particular task-set, leading
to a decreased cognitive ﬂexibility.
A third more cognitive mechanism for the interplay between
emotional and cognitive control is related to the competition
between both systems for the limited attentional resources (Schim-
mack, 2005). In line with this so-called attention hypothesis, it
has been shown that arousal related to an affective picture makes
it harder to withhold a pre-potent response in a stop-signal task
(Verbruggen andDeHouwer, 2007) and onno-go trials in a go/no-
go task (De Houwer and Tibboel, 2010). In sum, this hypothesis
entails that affective information interferes strongly with behavior
that asks for cognitive control, such as processes responsible for
withholding a pre-potent response, because arousal induced by
affective information taxes cognitive resources.
The three aforementioned hypotheses for the interplay between
cognitive and emotional control were investigated within the
task-switching paradigm, which offers a lab-analog for cognitive
ﬂexibility. Task-switching is a well-established tool for studying
cognitive control in a setting in which participants are frequently
imposed to switch from one task to another (for reviews see Mon-
sell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010;Vandierendonck et al., 2010).A typical
ﬁnding is that switching tasks elicits a switch cost, which is indi-
cated by longer RTs and more errors on task switches than on task
repetitions. The switch cost is considered as an index of processes
that copewith the reconﬁgurationof the cognitive system fromone
task to another but alsowith the interference this brings along (e.g.,
Allport et al., 1994; Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996, 2008;
Mayr and Kliegl, 2000;Waszak et al., 2003). In the present study we
favored to use the voluntary task-switching (VTS) procedure over
more traditional task-switchingprocedures for three reasons. First,
traditional task-switching procedures only have a limited ecologi-
cal validity because they impose tasks to the participants, resulting
in a rather artiﬁcial situation (seeVandierendonck et al., 2010).We
argue that VTS offers are more complete view of cognitive con-
trol, since participants can make free task choices. Second, recent
studies have shown that switch costs in VTS are more likely to
reﬂect cognitive control than switch costs observed in traditional
task-switching procedures (e.g., Liefooghe et al., 2009, 2010; but
see Yeung, 2010). Third, some studies have found evidence that
the selection component and the execution component in VTS
are underlain by distinct sets of processes and are taxing different
sets of control processes (see also Arrington and Yates, 2009; But-
ler et al., 2011). Thus, besides a switch cost, this procedure also
offers an additional index of choice behavior and thus of cogni-
tive ﬂexibility. Typically, participants prefer repeating tasks. This
phenomenon is called the task-repetition bias and is thought to
result from a difﬁculty to disengage from a previously executed
task (Demanet et al., 2010; Vandamme et al., 2010).
In order to investigate the immediate inﬂuence of valence and
arousal on VTS, in the present study, affective pictures were pre-
sented. Three types of pictures were used: (a) pictures with a
positive valence and high arousal; (b) pictures with a neutral
valance and low arousal; and (c) pictures with a negative valence
and high arousal. These pictures were task-irrelevant and were
presented within the interval separating two consecutive VTS tri-
als. This procedure allowed us to investigate the inﬂuence of these
pictures on consecutive behavior.
Based on the valence hypothesis one could predict that infor-
mationwith a positive valence inﬂuences the ability to switch tasks.
On the basis of this hypothesis, we predict that positive informa-
tion will enhance cognitive ﬂexibility (e.g., Isen and Daubman,
1984; Greene and Noice, 1988; Isen et al., 1992; Kuhl and Kazén,
1999; Bolte et al., 2003; Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach,
2006), possibly by increased levels of DA in the striatum (Aarts
et al., 2011), resulting not only in improved global performance
but also in an improvement of the ability to switch tasks. In addi-
tion, because the size of the task-repetition bias is inversely related
to the efﬁciency of cognitive control to disengage fromapreviously
executed task (e.g.,Mayr and Bell, 2006; Demanet et al., 2010), this
account predicts that the repetition bias will be smaller following
positive affective pictures.
According to the arousal hypothesis one would predict that
arousing stimuli strengthen the activated task-sets, irrespective to
the valence of these stimuli (e.g., Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005;
Verguts and Notebaert, 2009). Consequently, a strengthened task-
set should lead to more facilitation on task repetitions and more
interference on task switches, resulting in an increased switch cost
(Wylie and Allport, 2000; Yeung and Monsell, 2003). With respect
to the task-repetition bias, this hypothesis may imply that because
task-sets have been strengthened by arousal, their higher activation
may encourage participants to re-select the previously executed
task. In other words, a higher task-repetition bias is expected.
According to the attention hypothesis (Schimmack, 2005; Ver-
bruggen andDeHouwer,2007;DeHouwer andTibboel,2010), it is
predicted that arousing stimuli will occupy the cognitive resources
needed to switch tasks. As a result, this will lead to higher switch
costs. In contrast to the arousal hypothesis, the attention hypothe-
sis predicts that the higher switch cost following arousing pictures
will only be caused by slower task switches and not by faster task
repetitions. According to the attention hypothesis, all behavior,
thus even behavior that requires less attentional resources, such as
during task repetitions, will be impaired following arousing pic-
tures, although to a smaller extent than during task switches (e.g.,
De Houwer and Tibboel, 2010). Therefore, this hypothesis entails
that, next to a higher switch cost and task-repetition bias, arousal
will lead to an impairment of global performance, which should
for instance be reﬂected in a global increase of reaction times and
error rates following arousing pictures.
The three hypotheses seem to suggest that manipulations that
affect the size of the switch cost also automatically affect the size
of the task-repetition bias. Although evidence was reported that
both are related (e.g., Mayr and Bell, 2006), recent studies have
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shown that the underlying processes are not identical (Arrington
and Yates, 2009; Butler et al., 2011) and thus may measure differ-
ent aspects of cognitive control. Therefore it is difﬁcult to predict
whether both will be inﬂuenced in a similar way by the affective
information.
MATERIALS AND METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty students of Ghent University participated for course require-
ments. Sixteen were excluded from analysis because they exceeded
the threshold of 80% task repetitions (for a similar cut-off pro-
cedure see Arrington and Logan, 2004, 2005). All 44 participants
(23 females) had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were
naïve to the purpose of the experiment.
MATERIALS
The target stimuli were the symbols “#” and “%” presented in
the colors purple and green. Participants either categorized the
identity of the symbol (symbol task) or the color (color task)
of the symbol. Participants performed both tasks manually and
responded on a QWERTY keyboard. Both tasks were assigned to
a different hand. The symbol task was performed with the left
hand with the response keys “D” for symbol “#” and “F” for sym-
bol “%.” The color task was performed with the right hand with
the response keys “J” for purple symbols and “K” for green sym-
bols. Fifteen pictures (448/336 pixels) were selected from the IAPS.
Because previous studies found sex differences in the ratings for
the IAPS pictures (e.g., Bradley et al., 2001), this was done for male
and female participants separately. These pictureswere categorized
in three conditions of ﬁve pictures (Table A1 in Appendix): posi-
tive, neutral and negative. As shown in Table A1 in Appendix the
positive andnegative pictureswerematched in function of arousal.
The mean arousal score was higher for positive and negative pic-
tures than for neutral pictures. Important to mention is that in
order to match the arousal level of the positive pictures with the
level of the negative pictures we had to include erotic pictures for
the male subjects. This was not the case for female subjects.
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested individually by means of a Pentium III
personal computer with a 17-inch color monitor running Tscope
(Stevens et al., 2006). Instructions were presented on screen and
paraphrased if necessary. The instructions stated that participants
were free to select which task to perform on each trial, as long as
they performed each task an approximate equal number of times
and the pattern of task choices was not predictable. In order to
explain unpredictability, we translated the coin-ﬂipping metaphor
of Arrington and Logan’s (2004, 2005) studies into Dutch. This
metaphor entails that subjects sometimes will have to repeat the
same task and sometimes have to switch between tasks and that
they have to choose the tasks as if ﬂipping the coin has decided
which task to perform.
The experiment started with a practice block of 60 trials, fol-
lowed by 10 test blocks of 60 trials. There was a short break of
approximately 30 s following each block. On each trial, a task-
irrelevant affective picture was presented for 900 ms and disap-
peared. The picture type (positive, negative, neutral) varied from
trial to trial and followed an unpredictable pattern. In order to
investigate the immediate inﬂuence of valence and arousal onVTS,
we presented the task-irrelevant affective pictures at the beginning
of each trial. Subsequently, a neutral target stimulus was pre-
sented in the center of a black screen in ARIAL font, size 108.
When a response was given or a maximum presentation time of
6000 ms had elapsed, the target stimulus disappeared. For incor-
rect responses theword“FOUT”(error) was presented for 1000 ms
before the ITI of 100 ms started (for a schematic overview see
Figure 1).
RESULTS
First, trials were categorized according to the task that was chosen
on the basis of the response hands. Next, trials were classiﬁed as a
task repetition or a task switch. First trials of a block, trials follow-
ing an error and trials with RTs shorter than 50 ms were excluded
from analysis (data loss: 13.3%). Because we were interested in
immediate effects of valence and arousal on the ability to switch
tasks, we wanted to avoid that our measures were contaminated
by the inﬂuence of the affective picture presented on the previous
trial. Therefore, we focused on trials following trials in which a
neutral picture was presented. By comparing task choice and task
performance on positive pictures, neutral, and negative pictures,
we tested for the inﬂuence of valence, and by comparing posi-
tive and negative pictures with neutral pictures we tested for the
inﬂuence of arousal.
TASK PERFORMANCE
RTs and error rates were subjected to a 2 (task transition: task-
repetition or task switch) by 3 (trial type: positive, neutral, or
negative) repeated measures ANOVA with an alpha-level of 0.05.
RTs and accuracies of each cell of the design are shown in Figures 2
and 3 respectively. For RTs, the main effect of task transition was
signiﬁcant, F(1,43)= 60.11, MSE= 19031, ηp2= 0.58, indicating
that RTs were higher on task switches (M = 767 ms, SE= 28) than
on task repetitions (M = 635 ms, SE= 26). The main effect of
FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of a trial.
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FIGURE 2 | Reaction times as a function of task transition and trial type.
trial type was signiﬁcant, F(2,86)= 2.57, MSE= 4904, p= 0.08,
ηp
2= 0.06. Planned comparisons showed that RTs on positive
trials (M = 689 ms, SE= 23) were faster than on negative trials
(M = 713 ms, SE= 28), F(1,43)= 5.17, MSE= 4871, ηp2= 0.11,
but did not differ from neutral trials (M = 700 ms, SE= 28),
F(1,43)= 1.14, MSE= 4849, ηp2= 0.03. Also the RTs on neu-
tral trials did not differ reliably from the RTs on negative trials,
F(1,43)= 1.42, MSE= 4992, ηp2= 0.03. The difference between
positive andnegative trials indicates that positive valence facilitates
general task performance. The interaction between task transi-
tion and trial type was signiﬁcant1, F(2,86)= 3.12, MSE= 4402,
ηp
2= 0.07 (see Figure 2). Planned comparisons showed that the
switch cost was larger on positive (139 ms) than on neutral trials
(104 ms), F(1,43)= 2.85, MSE= 4927, p< 0.10, ηp2= 0.06, but
this difference was only marginally signiﬁcant. Also on negative
trials (152 ms) the switch cost was higher than on neutral trials,
F(1,43)= 5.48, MSE= 4646, ηp2= 0.11. There was no difference
between switch costs on positive and negative trials, F < 1, indi-
cating that the valence of the affective picture did not affect the
switch cost. In order to investigate the effect of arousal on the
switch cost we collapsed both high arousal conditions (positive
and negative trials) and compared the mean RTs with the mean RT
of the low arousal condition (neutral trials). As the individual con-
trasts already suggested, this analysis showed that the switch cost
was signiﬁcantly larger with high-arousing pictures than with low-
arousing pictures, F(1,43)= 4.98, MSE= 5170, ηp2= 0.10. Addi-
tional analyses showed that this higher switch cost was primarily
caused by faster task repetitions, F(1,43)= 4.33, MSE= 2768,
1An additional analysis showed that gender did not modulate the interaction
between trial type and task transition, F(2,84)= 1.07, p= 0.34. This also indicates
that the use of erotic pictures for themale subjects did not play an important role and
can thus be excluded as an alternative explanation for the absence of an inﬂuence
of valence on the switch cost.
ηp
2= 0.09, and not by slower task switches following arousing
pictures, F(1,43)= 1.88, MSE= 7340, p= 0.18, ηp2= 0.04.
On the error rates we found that participants made more
errors on task switches (M = 0.07, SE= 0.008) than on task rep-
etitions (M = 0.05, SE= 0.004), F(1,43)= 14.59, MSE= 0.0025,
ηp
2= 0.25. The main effect of trial type was not signiﬁcant,
F(2,86)= 1.54, MSE= 0.0020, p= 0.22, ηp2= 0.03. The interac-
tion between task transition and trial type was marginally sig-
niﬁcant, F(2,86)= 2.55, MSE= 0.0020, p= 0.08, ηp2= 0.06 (see
Figure 3). Planned comparisons showed that the switch cost was
marginally signiﬁcantly larger on positive (0.027) than on neutral
trials (0.016), F(1,43)= 2.95, MSE= 0.0017, p< 0.10, ηp2= 0.06.
The switch cost on negative trials (0.047) was also higher than
on neutral trials, F(1,43)= 5.17, MSE= 0.0020, ηp2= 0.11. No
difference in switch cost was observed between the positive and
negative trials, F < 1, again suggesting that the valence of the
affective picture did not affect the switch cost. After collapsing
positive and negative high-arousing pictures, an additional analy-
sis showed that the switch cost was higher with high-arousing than
with neutral pictures, F(1,43)= 6.40, MSE= 0.002, ηp2= 0.13.
Additional analyses showed that this higher switch cost was caused
by more errors during task switches, F(1,43)= 6.88,MSE= 0.002,
ηp
2= 0.09, and not by fewer errors during task-repetitions, F < 1.
In order to differentiate between the arousal and the attention
hypothesis it is important to mention that global performance,
both on RTs and error rates, was never impaired following high-
arousing pictures compared to neutral low-arousing pictures.
TASK CHOICE
In addition, the task choices were analyzed. For each trial type,
the proportion of task repetitions and switches was calculated.
Because the proportion of repetitions and switches are comple-
mentary, namely p(switches)= 1-p(repetitions), we only focused
on the proportion of task repetitions. On these proportions we
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FIGURE 3 | Error rates as a function of task transition and trial type.
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with trial type (positive,
neutral, or negative) as single factor. The main effect of trial type
was not signiﬁcant, F(2,86)= 1.40, MSE= 0.0035, ηp2= 0.03,
indicating that the proportion of task repetitions did not dif-
fer between positive (M = 0.603, SE= 0.020), neutral (M = 0.595,
SE= 0.020), andnegative trials (M = 0.616,SE= 0.018).After col-
lapsing positive and negative high-arousing pictures, an additional
analysis showed that the task-repetition bias did not differ between
high-arousing and neutral pictures, F(1,43)= 1.70, MSE= 0.004,
ηp
2= 0.04.
DISCUSSION
In the present study we focused on the relation between emotional
and cognitive control by investigating the inﬂuence of the valence
and arousal of task-irrelevant pictures on cognitive ﬂexibility dur-
ing VTS. It was found that arousal speciﬁcally affected the switch
cost and that valence affected global performance but did not affect
the switch cost. The preference to repeat or switch was not affected
by the arousal neither by the valence of the affective pictures.
The results support the arousal hypothesis as it showed that
the switch cost increased following arousing stimuli. Both ﬁnd-
ings of a larger switch cost caused by facilitated task repetitions, as
found for the response latencies, and a larger switch cost caused
by impaired task switches, as found for the error rates, are in
line with the predictions of the arousal hypothesis (Verguts and
Notebaert, 2009). According to Verguts and Notebaert (2009)
high-arousing pictures lead to larger switch costs because the
stimulus-response associations related to the previously executed
task-set become strengthened through increased Hebbian learn-
ing. As such, switching toward the alternative task becomes more
difﬁcult, while repeating the same task is facilitated (see also
Figure 4 for a schematic presentation). The pattern of results of the
present study is remarkably similar to the ﬁndings of Braem et al.
(2011) that showed that switch costs increased following conﬂict
trials. Thepresent ﬁnding that arousal inducedby affective pictures
can have a similar inﬂuence on the switch cost can be considered as
FIGURE 4 | Scheme of the application of the noradrenalin account of
Verguts and Notebaert (2009) on the switch cost inVTS.
indirect support for the hypothesis of Braem et al. (2011) stating
that reductions in switch costs following conﬂict trials are related
to the level of arousal triggered by the experience of a response
conﬂict, facilitating task repetitions, and impairing task switches.
At ﬁrst sight, the ﬁnding that the switch cost was higher fol-
lowing arousing stimuli also seems to be in line with the attention
hypothesis as proposed by Schimmack (2005) and De Houwer
and colleagues (Verbruggen and De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer
and Tibboel, 2010). These authors argued that arousal interferes
with cognitively controlled behaviour, because arousal occupies
the necessary cognitive resources. In the context of task switching
this hypothesis entails that processes such as task-reconﬁguration
processes or processes necessary for interference control, which
are especially important on task switches, suffer from a lack of
available attentional resources caused by the arousing stimulus.
As a consequence this hypothesis predicts that especially the
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ability to switch tasks should suffer, leading to higher switch
costs. In addition, this hypothesis entails that performance on
task repetitions also should suffer because during task repetitions
in a task-switching context, cognitive control is also important,
although not as important as during task switches (e.g., Braver
et al., 2003). However, the results showed that task repetitions
following high-arousing pictures were never impaired, not on
the response latencies and error rates. The results even showed
that the higher switch costs observed on the response latencies
were driven mainly by facilitated task repetitions. Both these ﬁnd-
ings cannot be accounted for by the attention hypothesis, since
this hypothesis only predicts impaired performance in cognitively
demanding situations (e.g., De Houwer and Tibboel, 2010). It is
important to mention that, although the present data support the
arousal hypothesis,we donot state that competition for attentional
resources did not take place, since this effect is widely accepted and
replicated in a large amount of studies (e.g., Fox et al., 2001; Schim-
mack, 2005;Wyble et al., 2008).We simply argue that the attention
hypothesis cannot account for the observed facilitation on task
repetitions following arousing pictures and that an additional
mechanism, possibly related to the LC–NA system, also played
an important role in the observed interaction between emotional
and cognitive control.
In addition, we found that pictures with a positive valence
improved global performance, but we did not observe that valence
had an inﬂuence on the ability to switch tasks, both on the switch
cost and the task-repetition bias. As already mentioned in the
introduction, this ﬁndingdoesnot correspondwith a large amount
of studies in which was reported that positive information affects
cognitive ﬂexibility (e.g., Isen and Daubman, 1984; Greene and
Noice, 1988; Isen et al., 1992; Kuhl and Kazén, 1999; Bolte et al.,
2003; Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006). However,
we believe it is difﬁcult to compare the ﬁndings of these stud-
ies directly with the results of the present study, since in most
of these studies the effects of arousal were not controlled for. In
addition, as Cools et al. (2001) already pointed out, the effects
of DA modulations also strongly depend on the task demands.
In fact, most effects of valence have been reported in studies in
which subjects were not asked to switch between tasks and cog-
nitive ﬂexibility was measured with different paradigms. In the
single study that was designed to dissociate the effects of valence
and arousal of affective information on the ability to switch tasks,
performed by Dreisbach and Goschke (2004), was found that
subjects were more able to adapt to a task switch when posi-
tive information was presented. However, the procedure used in
that study differed strongly from the currently used procedure
in three important aspects. First, they used the so-called inter-
mittent instruction procedure, in which subjects had no free task
choice and tasks were only switched occasionally (once in each
block). Second, they did not investigate the impact of affective
pictures on the switch cost directly, but they investigated the dif-
ference in performing the ﬁve tasks before a task switch and the
ﬁve tasks following a task switch, which was indicated by a task
cue. Therefore, we think it is possible that the study of Dreisbach
and Goschke (2004) taps on a different component of cognitive
control, not on the ability to switch tasks from trial to trial, but
on the ability to adapt to changing task demands over a longer
period of time. We found indirect evidence for this explanation
by showing that the general performance improved following
positive than negative affective pictures. In addition, this ﬁnding
suggests that the valence of an affective picture affects multitask-
ing ability and cognitive control on a more general level, possibly
by phasic modulations of DA (Ashby et al., 1999; Cools et al.,
2009). Third, in comparison with the present study, Dreisbach
and Goschke (2004) did not mix positive and negative trials with
neutral trials in a single block. This difference could have caused
the failure in the present study to ﬁnd an inﬂuence of valence,
since it is possible that mixing positive and negative affect cancels
out the short-term effects of valence. In sum, the inconsisten-
cies between ﬁndings in the study of Dreisbach and Goschke
(2004) and the present study concerning the effects of emo-
tional valence suggest that more research is necessary in order
to capture the critical conditions in which emotional valence
has an inﬂuence on the ability to adapt ﬂexibly to a changing
environment.
The inﬂuence of arousal on the switch cost, and the hypoth-
esis that this effect is caused by task-set strengthening, converges
with the more recent assumption that the switch cost is mainly
related to interference control that is needed to cope with per-
sisting task-set activation (Wylie and Allport, 2000; Yeung and
Monsell, 2003), and not by switch-speciﬁc task-reconﬁguration
processes (e.g., Rogers and Monsell, 1995). Interestingly, we found
that the switch cost but not the proportion of task repetitions var-
ied with arousal. In convergence with recent research on VTS,
this suggests that the selection component and the execution
component in VTS are underlain by distinct sets of processes
and are tapping on different aspects of cognitive control (see
also Arrington and Yates, 2009; Butler et al., 2011). More impor-
tantly, this ﬁnding suggests an important feature of the interplay
between emotional and cognitive control, namely that not every
aspect of cognitive control is necessarily inﬂuenced by arousal.
More precisely, it seems that arousal only affects those aspects
of cognitive control related to behavioral stability and reduced
distractibility, such as processes responsible for interference con-
trol. Arousal helps avoiding interference of irrelevant task-sets by
strengthening the currently relevant task-set. This hypothesis can
be related to a VTS study of Butler et al. (2011) where it was
observed that individual differences in working-memory capacity
affected task performance but not task choice in VTS. Based on
the ﬁnding that a key feature of working-memory capacity is the
ability to cope with interference of irrelevant information (Kane
et al., 2001), it thus seems that task performance is affected by
arousal because it comprises interference control,while task choice
does not.
In conclusion, the present study was the ﬁrst to investigate
the impact of arousal and valence of a task-irrelevant stimulus
on the ability to switch tasks voluntarily. We found that pre-
senting affective pictures affected the ability to switch between
tasks. The data showed that arousal related to an affective stimulus
made it more difﬁcult to switch between tasks. This result is in
line with the binding account of Verguts and Notebaert (2009)
that states that phasic modulation of NA plays an important
role in the functional overlap between emotional and cognitive
control because an arousing signal triggers the noradrenergic
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 336 | 6
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system that reinforces the previously executed task. In addition,we
observed that presenting positive pictures only improved global
performance but did not affect the ability to switch between
tasks compared to negative pictures. This ﬁnding suggests that
positive valence affects general multitasking performance but
does not have an immediate inﬂuence on the efﬁciency of the
processes that are necessary to switch between tasks from trial to
trial.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | An overview of the selected pictures of different subsets for gender, valence and arousal (the mean valence rating and the mean
arousal rating of the IAPS pictures are presented in parentheses).
Female, positive/high: 8496, 8490, 8370, 8185, 8370 (Mean valence=7.77; mean arousal=6.95)
Female, neutral/low: 7500, 7224, 5500, 7234, 7130 (Mean valence=4.89; mean arousal=3.04)
Female, negative/high: 6250, 3400, 3500, 6510, 6540 (Mean valence=2.12; mean arousal=7.06)
Male, positive/high: 4002, 4180, 4220, 4250, 4290 (Mean valence=7.94; mean arousal=7.09.)
Male, neutral/low: 7500, 7224, 5500, 7234, 7130 (Mean valence=4.89; mean arousal=3.04)
Male, negative/high: 3000, 3010, 3530, 6260, 6350 (Mean valence=2.28; mean arousal=7.01)
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